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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
LAND-STRUCTURE SPLIT TAX SYSTEM IN KOREA:  
ANALYSES FOCUSING ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAX RATIO OF 
STRUCTURE TO LAND AND AREA RATIO OF IT. 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
LEE, Jaeho 
 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to see if the two-rate tax shrinks supply of building spatial area 
per land. For that I used panel data of fifteen different cities and provinces. The government 
of South Korea has changed its real estate tax system from two-rate tax to compounded tax 
for housing but not for commercial building. Therefore, in this paper, it is tested whether 
changed tax system encouraged or discouraged the supply of spatial area for housing. For the 
tax system of the commercial building is consistent with the same period, it is tested whether 
the tax ratio between land and improvement affects the supply of spatial area. The result, it is 
revealed that either lower building tax or higher building tax encourages capital intensity. 
Therefore, we can say that to improve capital intensity; in other words, to use land more 
efficiently, the government has to collect more tax on land and less on building. Policy 
implication is drawn. 
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I. Introduction 
 
A. Motivation 
Since South Korea has been established, it has experienced explosive GDP growth. 
In the case of land price, surprisingly, the growth rate was even much faster than that of GDP. 
It is obvious that higher housing price must be attributed to high price level of land not to the 
price of building itself. Nowadays, in Seoul, South Korea, it is very tough for a salary man to 
buy a house by himself without aid because it would take almost 11 to 16.2 years with only 
labor income, and without any expenditure.
 1
 Thus, those who do own a house and who do 
not will be situated under very different situations, even when they have the same levels of 
income. 
Therefore, previously, many presidential regimes tried to constrain the soaring 
housing price by controlling either the supply side or the demand side and yet have not 
succeeded. In 2007, according to the administration, for the last 40 years, the majority of 
government policies can be summarized as three points: constraining the demand, de-
regulation or business activation, and housing welfare policy.
2
 On the contrary to the 
government policies, it is said that the regulation oriented policies are not suitable for any 
market which is composed as supply and demand due to the distortion by regulations. Market 
oriented policy has been accepted by many scholars for a long time as the Bible in economics. 
                                                          
1 Referring KB Bank statistics of June 2011, on average, household income class corresponding to its 
mean housing price in Seoul. For all cities, it ranges from 5.2 to 6.8 years. 
2
 Gukjeong Briefing  Teukbyeolgihoek team, “Daehanminguk Budongsan 40Nyeon (40 years of real 
estate in the Republic of Korea),” (Seoul: Hansmedia, 2007), 14 
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Direct control of the housing price by manipulating supply and demand seems 
meaningful; however, the government is not likely to seriously take into account that land 
and house have to be considered separately. The problem begins from here, because land and 
buildings are considered as a single unit when real estate policy is discussed; however, it is 
composed of very different two factors: land and improvement. In the other words, land and 
buildings have different traits; for instance, land can never be moved, destroyed, produced or 
depreciated, but buildings can. Then, in which way should the real-estate policy be changed? 
And what method should be applied? 
 
B. Tax on Real Estate 
The Rho’s administration of South Korea initiated a new real estate policy which can 
be summarized as heavier tax on real estate, wishing that the price be stabilized. Tax is quite 
a controversial issue in almost every state; especially real estate tax in South Korea. The new 
real estate tax which was introduced by the Rho’s government in South Korea is based on 
Henry George’s idea: single land tax. Henry George’s single land tax is based on a view that 
any kind of tax on artificial production discourages the will to work but a tax on land or 
natural resources does not discourage it; meaning that a tax on an inelastic good is neutral. 
Many different opinions have been raised regarding single land tax claim. The tax on 
land value is generally considered as a desirable tax or lesser of the worst. In an interview 
with herald times, Milton Friedman
3
 answered a question of interviewer: 
“I find income tax totally antagonistic to true free enterprise. Can we run the 
country without income tax?” and the answer was “….So the question is, which are the 
                                                          
3
 1976 Novel prize laureate in economics. 
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least bad taxes? In my opinion the least bad tax is the property tax on the unimproved 
value of land, the Henry George argument of many, many years ago.”4  
William Vickrey
5
 also said that 
“The property tax is, economically speaking, a combination of one of the 
worst taxes-the part that is assessed on real estate improvements and in some cases to a 
limited extent on personality-and one of the best taxes-the tax on land or site value.”6 
The ground of the two Novel laureates is that there would be no excess burden by taxation if 
we assume that the total amount of land is fixed. On the other hand, property tax could affect 
construction activities for building space supply; in other words, it causes excess burden. 
The point raised by the Novel prize laureates is exactly repeated by Denise 
DiPasquale and William C. Wheaton
7
. They suggested a conceptual framework in the 
markets for real estate assets and space. They analyzed real estate market and concluded that 
price of real estate is affected by regulations: tax treatment of real estate, long-term interest 
rate and availability of construction financing. In this analysis, the property is not divided into 
land and building, thus both are applied at the same rate of tax. Therefore, this framework 
would not be adequate to see what actually happened in the Rho’s administration’s real estate 
policy and how the tax worked in the real estate market
8
; by levying tax on real estate, 
                                                          
4 “Milton Friedman Interviewed: The Times Herald, Norristown, Pennsylvania; Friday, 1 December, 
1978,” http://www.cooperativeindividualism.org/friedman-milton_interview-1978.html (accessed Oct 
20, 2011) 
5
 1996 Novel prize laureate in economics 
6  Kenneth C. Wenzer, ed., Land Value Taxation: The Equitable and Efficient Source of Public 
Finance (New York: M.E.Sharpe, Inc., 1999), 17. 
7
 Denise DiPasquale and William C. Wheaton, “The Markets for Real Estate Assets and Space: A 
Conceptual Framework,” Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association 20, 
no.1 (1992): 181-197. 
8
 Because previous government changed its housing property tax system from separated taxation to 
aggregated taxation. 
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housing price went up and excess burden arose-which would not have been necessary if tax 
was levied on land itself. 
Referring Henry George, Milton Friedman, and William Vickrey it seems desirable if 
we can separate structure from land so that the government increases tax rate on land more 
than that on structures. In that sense, Wallace E. Oates and Robert M. Schwab presented 
empirical evidence of the two-rate tax with a case from the city of Pittsburgh. The city’s 
property tax system was restructured in 1979 and 1980 tuning the tax ratio between land and 
improvement as five to one. It is not easy to separate this restructured tax scheme effect from 
other economic events; however, the empirical evidence of Pittsburgh shows outstanding 
results compared to the other fourteen cities in their sample. Pittsburgh indicated a 
remarkable performance; the real value of building permits on an annual basis rose by some 
70 percent in the 1980s relative to the twenty-year period preceding the tax reform.
9
 
 
C. Two-Rate Tax on Land and Improvement 
Jan K. Brueckner(1999) analyzed what impact would occur if split-tax was levied 
with different tax rate on land and improvement instead of property tax imposing the same 
rate on land and improvement. And he found that property tax induces urban sprawl because 
the tax reduces intensity of land development and constructors can develop the margin of the 
                                                          
9 Oates, Wallace E. and Schwab, Robert M, "The Impact of Urban Land Taxation: The Pittsburgh 
Experience." The National Tax Journal 50, no. 1 (1997): 8, http:// 
ntj.tax.org/wwtax/ntjrec.nsf/dockey/893168271A5088AD85256863004A5942?OpenDocument 
(accessed September 19, 2011). 
 ５ 
city at a relatively cheaper price than the center of the city. Reversely, the split-tax gives an 
incentive to increase intensity of land development limiting urban sprawl.
10
 
In Korea, property tax and land tax were graded separately, but the tax rate between 
land and improvement was not much different. Throughout this study, I will try to see if 
whether George’s idea-increase tax rate on land than improvement-has changed the capital 
intensity in South Korea or not. After that, the policy issues inquired to initiate the ‘Two-Rate 
Tax’ in practice and the expected result from that will be discussed. It would be meaningful if 
this study is helpful to initiate future policies in the real estate market and taxation, so that the 
central and local governments can provide better housing environments for the national and 
local people. 
 
D. Research Question, Methodology, and Key Findings 
As known it is, general property tax reduces the supply of spatial area; then, does the 
two-rate tax shrink supply of spatial area on the unit of land as well? For answering the 
question, I ran the regression analysis with fixed effect with fifteen different cities and 
provinces. The result, in case of house, building to land tax ratio has a negative effect on 
capital intensity; except for cities from 2001 to 2004. By the way, house price index has a 
positive relationship with capital intensity; except for provinces from 2003 to 2004. For 
commercial building, on the other hand, it is revealed that building tax rate and population 
density have negative correlation with capital intensity; however, regional GDP per capita 
has a positive relationship with it. 
                                                          
10 Jan K. Brueckner, “Property Taxation and Urban Sprawl” (paper presented at the Lincoln Institute 
Conference on Property Taxation and Local Government Finance, Scottsdale, Arizona, January 16-18, 
2000) 
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II. Integrated Tax VS. Two-Rate Tax 
 
A. Taxation Principle and Single Tax Debate 
Prior to discussing about two-rate tax, it is required to review the single tax because 
single tax is the origin of two-rate tax. It has been known in general that Henry George is the 
initiator of the single land tax; however, even before him, single land tax was already 
proposed. John Locke (1727~1781) argued to practice single land tax because land tax to the 
landlord is not passed through to the others. French physiocrat, François Quesnay 
(1694~1774) and Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, Baron de Laune (1727~1781) contended the 
same argument with George. Because they understood land tax is not passed through to the 
others; and taxes incur dead weight loss except for land tax and it burdens not only the 
landlord but also the entire society.
11
 
George suggested following 4 conditions that should be considered in tax collecting 
for public revenue:
 12
 
1. That it bears as lightly as possible upon production—so as least to check 
the increase of the general fund from which taxes must be paid and the community 
maintained. 
                                                          
11
 Jungjeon LEE, “Henry George eui sasang gua gueui togee dan il se e lon (A thought of Henry 
George and his single land tax theory),” Hangukjaejeonghakhoe, Je2jip (Mar 1988): 112-13. 
12 Library of Economics and Liberty, “Progress and Poverty An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial 
Depressions and of Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth: The Remedy,”  
http://www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/George/grgPP34.html# VIII.III.1 (accessed October 20, 
2011). 
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2. That it be easily and cheaply collected, and fall as directly as may be upon 
the ultimate payers—so as to take from the people as little as possible in addition to 
what it yields the government. 
3. That it be certain—so as to give the least opportunity for tyranny or 
corruption on the part of officials, and the least temptation to law-breaking and evasion 
on the part of the taxpayers. 
4. That it bear equally—so as to give no citizen an advantage or put any at a 
disadvantage, as compared with others. 
George’s single land tax is based on two major principles which are ‘Private Ownership’ and 
‘Benefit-Received Principle’.13 Regarding the private ownership, George’s view is that it 
should be allowed to justify only as much as the amount of an individual labor contribution. 
However, increased land value is formed by the efforts of the whole society; therefore it has 
to be reaped by the society. E.R.A. Seligman refuted by saying that there is nothing produced 
by the effort of only one person, thus increased land value should be treated the same as the 
other goods; meaning that a product-which is made by the whole society in some sense-
should be owned by an individual, so does increased land value. In the view of neoclassical 
economists, however, it is not reasonable letting the landlords take unearned income.
14
 
Unfortunately, however, if they are asked ‘How we measure an individual’s contribution to a 
single product?’, then they would have no answer about it. 
Secondly, as J.S. Mill criticized ‘Benefit-Received Principle’ and argued ‘Ability to 
Pay Principle’, so did Seligman. In other words, tax should be levied according to the tax 
                                                          
13
 Ibid. 
14
 According to the classical economists, George’s words can be written as ‘MPL = wage’, namely, 
producers are paid by the amount of their contribution. However, Seligman says that the owner has to 
takes all. 
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payer’s abilities. The second critic from E.R.A. Seligman still remains as a form of question 
like ‘Should the government levy tax on income-ability to pay- or assets-benefit received?’  
On top of that, there are some practical limitations. Following LEE, Seligman 
classified the single land tax’s problems as four categories: financial problem, political 
problem, universality and equity, and economic problem.
15
 First of all, financial problem; he 
argued that taxation should be flexible according to the governments’ necessities. For 
example, in case of emergency, the single land tax policy cannot increase its revenue. In 
addition, ‘a standard of assessment’ is hardly estimated since the increased capital value is 
embedded in the land value through land improving work. Second, it is about political 
problem; if the government imposes the single land tax, those who do not have any piece of 
land have no reason to pay the tax to the government which may lose the loyalty of the 
national people and the government cannot exercise taxation as a policy tool for national 
interests, such as tariff for specific industries. Third, it violates universality and equity; it is 
unfair if tax should be only levied on land but not on any other assets, because land is also 
one element consisting of assets. On top of that, if the reason of single land tax that had to be 
collected is due to unearned income, why not the other unearned income? Fourth, it causes 
economic problem; it might be either sufficient or not according to the local governments’ 
land value.  
Kwack, Taewon, another critic, had five points regarding single land tax.
16
 First, land 
value sharing by Henry George is not consistent with his logical thinking. If we thoroughly 
follow his idea, every nation has to share the earth beyond the boundary of a nation-state level. 
Second, land cannot be properly shared due to its characteristics in practical use. It is very 
                                                          
15
 Quoted in Jungjeon LEE ibid., 113 (Original source: Seligman, Edwin R.A. Essays in Taxation, 
(London: The Macmillan Co., 1919), 71) 
16
 Taewon Kwack, “Togee nun gong you dwe yeo ya ha nun ga? (Should the private ownership of the 
land be outlawed?),” (Korea Economic Research Institute, 2005),176-9 
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appealing to call land as ‘common inherit’, however, it is impossible to allow every people to 
access freely to land because land is neither a free good nor a public good. Third, gratuitous 
confiscation is unacceptable in the view of justice. Even though it is right in principle, it is not 
acceptable to achieve the purpose at the expenses of the current land owners. Fourth, 
Georgist’s argument has no logical background attaining for efficient and just land 
distribution. Market mechanism would be rarely working if hundred percent of rent is 
absorbed via taxation. Fifth, Henry George’s predictions did not occur. Empirical evidence 
does not support his arguments: wage earners would be put under servitude or business cycle 
provoked due to land speculation and land monopoly. 
It seems that there are some misunderstandings about Henry George’s argument in 
Kwack’s critics. George already recognized the first and second points he made above. In 
other worlds, George has recognized that sharing the land physically is impossible due to its 
unique characteristic. That is the reason he contended sharing land value as a form of public 
revenue. 
Recently, Arthur O’Sullivan17 summarized three critics of single land tax suggesting 
two alternatives to a single tax in his text book-urban economics. 
The single tax has been criticized for three reasons. First, the single tax 
would decrease the net return to the land-owner (net land rent) to zero, making the 
market value of land zero. In other words, the government would essentially 
confiscate the land. This strikes many people as inequitable. Second, if the net 
return on land were zero, landowners would abandon their land, leaving 
government bureaucrats to decide who uses the land. Therefore, the government 
land market is less likely to allocate land to its highest and best use. The third 
                                                          
17
 Arthur O’Sullivan, “Urban Economics,” (New York: McGraw-Hil Irwin, 2009), 145 
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criticism is that it is difficult to measure land rent (and the appropriate tax). Most 
land has structures or other improvements, and it is difficult to separate the value 
generated by the raw land from the value generated by the improvements. 
There are two alternatives to a single tax. Under a partial land tax, the 
tax rate is less than 100 percent. A partial land tax would leave landowners with a 
positive net return, so the land market would continue to be run by those who 
have a private interest in allocating land to its highest bidder. A second alternative 
is the two-rate tax, or the split property tax. Under the conventional property tax, 
land and improvements are taxed at the same rate. A three percent property tax is 
actually a three percent tax on land and a three percent tax on improvements. 
Under a two-rate tax, the tax rate on land may be nine percent, while the tax rate 
on improvements may be 1 percent. The two-rate tax is widely used in Australia 
and New Zealand. It is also used in some cities in Pennsylvania. By imposing a 
lower tax on improvements, the two-rate tax would increase investment in 
housing, buildings, and other improvements. 
 
B. Inconsistent Policy Purpose 
The Rho’s administration of South Korea tried to decrease the price of land inspired 
by Henry George. However, what George wanted to do was not to stabilize the price of land, 
but he hoped to at least achieve economic justice and fairness through the taxation system 
and mitigate the gap between the richer and the poorer in the United States. According to his 
idea, definitely, the price of land will be equal to zero in theory when the government collects 
hundred percent of the potential rent. It might be attractive to the government officers to 
implement land tax as a tool of reducing the housing price; however, what the government 
increased is not the land tax but real estate tax. Consequently, it did not work well for the 
 １１ 
time when the new policy was implemented. Nowadays even Georgists do not agree with the 
single land tax for the reasons by E.R.A. Seligman, Kwack and O’Sullivan made above. 
Nevertheless, the intuition from George is still alive. As it was seen from the augmentation 
regarding single land tax, it has some drawbacks that are hardly negligible. Nevertheless the 
flaw of the single land tax, two-rate tax was stemmed from the single land tax: collecting tax 
more from land and less from buildings. 
 
C. Two-Rate Tax 
The discussion of two-rate tax starts from resource allocation efficiency. According 
to Brueckner
18
, property tax is composed with land tax and improvement at the same tax rate. 
While land tax is neutral
19
, tax on improvement affects to the capital intensity due to its 
decreasing excess burden. In other words, resources can be allocated inefficiently-less 
intensive of capital- under property tax than pure land tax or two-rate tax.  
Wallace E. Oates and Robert M. Schwab
20
 analyzed empirically with the case of 
Pittsburgh’s two-rate tax system and showed that Pittsburgh –when compared with the other 
fourteen cities– was outstanding among the fifteen cities regarding the average annual value 
of building permits in percentage change between 1960-1979 and 1980-1989. Only two out 
of fifteen cities had experienced increasing value –Pittsburgh 70.4% and Columbus15.4%– 
and the other thirteen cities were decreased by 34.63%. 
                                                          
18
 Brueckner. “Property Taxation and Urban Sprawl.” 
19
 Because land supply is fixed and it makes no excess burden, however, by Anderson, it is considered 
relatively more efficient. (i.e., generates a smaller marginal excess burden) 
20
 Wallace E. Oates and Robert M. Schwab, "The Impact of Urban Land Taxation: The Pittsburgh 
Experience," The National Tax Journal 50, no. 1 (1997): 8., under “Introduction,” 
http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/property-valuation-and-taxation-library/dl/ oates_schw ab.p df  
(accessed September 19, 2011) 
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Roy Bahl
21
 raised two major disadvantages in site value taxation corresponding to 
land in a part of two-rate tax. First problem is an assessment problem. For valuation of the 
land, total value of the property should first be evaluated and then the value of improvement 
has to be subtracted. Because there is a few evidence of vacant land sales in urban areas. This 
land value is likely to be evaluated in a subjective way than property valuation. Second 
problem is that the government has more chance having decreased tax amount by levying less 
tax on properties than before. Thus, the government might increase the tax rate on land so 
that the tax revenue can be the same as before; however, it is not an easy task to do so.  
                                                          
21
 Roy Bahl, Fiscal Decentralization, Revenue Assignment, And The Case For The Property Tax In 
South Africa, (Working Paper 01-7, 2001), 10.  
 １３ 
III. Data 
 
A. Data Collection 
The materials referred here are from ‘Annual Local Tax Statistics Report’ by the 
Ministry of Public Administration and Security’s board under ‘Korean Statistical Information 
Service’ (KOSIS) 22 . The tables and graphs 23  shown below is basically the relationship 
between tax and supply of structure space. I reconstructed the data with the raw data from 
KOSIS and the time period for the collected data ranges from 2001 to 2009. I separated the 
period by two before and after 2005 for house and derived the differences between each 
period. I used differenced data set: 32 observations for residential housing in sixteen different 
districts from 2001 to 2004 and from 2005 to 2009, respectively. The reason I separated 
residential housing from commercial building is the available data set was different and for 
the house, I tried to see if the changed real estate tax policy
24
 in South Korea since 2005 has a 
significant effect on the supply of structure space that is consisted of commercial building 
and housing. 
  
                                                          
22
 http://www.kosis.kr/   
23
 Refer to ‘Data Analysis’ part 
24
 Integrated tax on house and land or split tax on both. 
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B. Data Description 
The relationship will be displayed in two ways: first, the relationship between spatial 
area of commercial building and the area of its land; second, the relationship between spatial 
area of residential housing and the area of its land. To show it, first of all, variables for the 
relationship have to be set. For the commercial building, the statistics describe the spatial area 
of the building and land for it. By the year 2004, the government taxes on residential building 
and its land separately; however, from the year of 2005, the government taxes on residential 
building and land at the same integrated tax rate. And plus, since 2005, the tax item has been 
changed as well. Thus, I used the area of land as the sum of area of the vacant land and 
cartilage; instead of cartilage which had used by 2004. Since 2005, the collected data of 
commercial building was not changed and only reports on commercial building excluding 
residential housing. Thus, there was no reason to reconstruct the data. But unfortunately, the 
data from 2005 to 2009 does not contain cartilage of the commercial building so only the 
spatial area of the commercial building was available. Summing up the whole story of how 
the data was collected and reconstructed is summarized below as <Table 1>. The restructured 
data is summarized in <Table 2> Spatial Area of Commercial Building and Tax Ratio of 
Commercial Building to Land. 
 
  
 １５ 
<Table 1> Data Availability before and after 2005
25
 
  2001-2004 2005-2009 
Commercial 
building 
Land Area Available Available 
Building Area Available Available 
Tax on Land N/A Available 
Tax on Building Available Available 
Residential 
Housing 
Land Area Available Available 
Building Area Available Available 
Tax on Land N/A 
Available
26
 
Tax on Building Available 
 
  
                                                          
25
 N/A data is because it was not separately reported. 
26
 Land and housing are applied at the same tax rate. 
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<Table2> Spatial Area of Commercial Building  
and Tax Ratio of Commercial Building to Land 
No Classification Variables 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 Seoul 
Building to land area ratio 2.71 2.97 3.03 3.04 3.14 
Building to land tax ratio 0.82 0.84 0.81 0.82 0.80 
2 Busan 
Building to land area ratio 2.30 2.99 3.10 2.97 2.95 
Building to land tax ratio 1.01 0.72 0.78 0.85 0.84 
3 Daegu 
Building to land area ratio 1.54 1.72 1.96 1.99 2.01 
Building to land tax ratio 1.07 1.11 0.96 0.93 0.90 
4 Incheon 
Building to land area ratio 1.88 1.80 1.76 1.69 1.74 
Building to land tax ratio 1.08 1.07 0.97 0.99 0.96 
5 Gwangju 
Building to land area ratio 2.62 1.14 1.76 1.83 1.88 
Building to land tax ratio 1.03 0.99 0.93 0.93 0.89 
6 Daejeon 
Building to land area ratio 3.24 1.99 1.96 1.94 2.01 
Building to land tax ratio 0.97 0.99 0.86 0.87 0.86 
7 Ulsan 
Building to land area ratio 2.25 2.13 1.90 1.77 1.80 
Building to land tax ratio 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.05 1.01 
8 Kyunggi 
Building to land area ratio 2.12 1.50 1.33 1.15 1.16 
Building to land tax ratio 1.06 1.02 1.21 0.95 0.94 
9 Gangwon 
Building to land area ratio 1.04 0.78 0.72 0.36 0.29 
Building to land tax ratio 1.25 1.27 1.03 1.10 1.09 
10 Chungbuk 
Building to land area ratio 1.58 1.42 1.21 0.91 0.57 
Building to land tax ratio 1.18 1.08 1.31 1.36 1.41 
11 Chungnam 
Building to land area ratio 1.56 1.42 1.32 0.76 0.64 
Building to land tax ratio 1.73 2.01 1.57 1.54 1.45 
12 Jeonbuk 
Building to land area ratio 1.55 1.42 1.00 0.82 0.73 
Building to land tax ratio 1.60 1.51 1.57 1.39 1.38 
13 Jeonnam 
Building to land area ratio 1.46 1.50 1.11 0.85 0.74 
Building to land tax ratio 1.50 1.45 1.37 1.29 1.28 
14 Gyeongbuk 
Building to land area ratio 1.70 1.43 1.24 1.04 0.93 
Building to land tax ratio 1.40 1.45 1.34 1.32 1.29 
15 Gyeongnam 
Building to land area ratio 2.42 1.99 1.59 0.82 0.75 
Building to land tax ratio 1.19 1.27 1.10 1.09 1.09 
16 Jeju 
Building to land area ratio 0.71 0.79 0.64 0.58 0.58 
Building to land tax ratio 1.24 0.88 0.87 0.90 0.86 
 
Source: Korea Statistical Information Service
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For the housing, the area of residential housing was investigated with the tax amount 
and tax base; however, the size of land was measured differently in the two periods.
28
. But 
there was no information about tax in cartilage area of residential housing. I used effective 
tax ratio between building and land for residential housing and the area of both. On the other 
hand, for the commercial building, I could get all the information that I needed: residential 
building area and cartilage area with the effective tax ratio at the same time. The calculated 
data is summarized in <Table 3> Spatial Area Ratio of Residential Building to Land and Tax 
Rate on Residential building. 
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 The problem was solved by adding vacant land to cartilage in second period 2005~2009 so as to 
make it parallel with the first period 2001~2004. 
 １８ 
<Table 3> Spatial Area Ratio of Residential Building to Land  
and Tax Rate on Residential building 
 
Classification Variable 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Seoul 
 
B/L ratio 1.297 1.513 1.666 1.725 1.762 2.106 1.773 1.943 1.968 
Tax rate29 0.416 0.442 0.459 0.490 0.121 0.094 0.106 0.209 0.151 
Busan 
 
B/L ratio 1.241 1.288 1.456 1.498 1.229 1.345 1.488 1.577 1.538 
Tax rate 0.344 0.344 0.367 0.373 0.163 0.162 0.164 0.143 0.104 
Daegu 
 
B/L ratio 1.260 1.377 1.349 1.603 0.872 0.935 1.210 1.415 1.443 
Tax rate 0.404 0.395 0.372 0.351 0.178 0.164 0.159 0.150 0.102 
Incheon 
 
B/L ratio 0.910 0.995 1.047 1.129 1.128 1.214 1.267 1.237 1.200 
Tax rate 0.343 0.345 0.352 0.341 0.174 0.168 0.153 0.135 0.106 
Gwangju 
 
B/L ratio 1.179 1.034 1.061 1.286 0.586 0.674 1.179 1.222 1.275 
Tax rate 0.349 0.340 0.349 0.327 0.149 0.131 0.137 0.131 0.095 
Daejeon 
 
B/L ratio 0.878 0.968 1.109 1.166 1.081 1.170 1.151 1.365 1.389 
Tax rate 0.368 0.370 0.377 0.380 0.165 0.151 0.158 0.153 0.103 
Ulsan 
 
B/L ratio 0.637 0.727 0.757 0.817 0.796 0.628 0.811 1.040 1.079 
Tax rate 0.337 0.309 0.316 0.401 0.147 0.141 0.125 0.128 0.097 
Kyunggi 
 
B/L ratio 0.927 1.170 0.786 0.949 0.742 0.680 0.811 1.018 1.023 
Tax rate 0.371 0.358 0.429 0.424 0.129 0.115 0.100 0.106 0.096 
Gangwon 
 
B/L ratio 0.330 0.323 0.334 0.355 0.200 0.224 0.397 0.450 0.427 
Tax rate 0.308 0.322 0.318 0.318 0.152 0.133 0.134 0.112 0.092 
Chungbuk 
 
B/L ratio 0.217 0.280 0.251 0.352 0.249 0.692 0.478 0.430 0.460 
Tax rate 0.347 0.337 0.340 0.317 0.151 0.130 0.132 0.125 0.109 
Chungnam 
 
B/L ratio 0.216 0.236 0.237 0.243 0.236 0.262 0.460 0.311 0.337 
Tax rate 0.328 0.321 0.325 0.327 0.150 0.142 0.139 0.133 0.095 
Jeonbuk 
 
B/L ratio 0.289 0.309 0.315 0.324 0.297 0.292 0.361 0.380 0.417 
Tax rate 0.397 0.341 0.331 0.321 0.136 0.131 0.144 0.121 0.093 
Jeonnam 
 
B/L ratio 0.184 0.197 0.176 0.234 0.248 0.201 0.240 0.284 0.294 
Tax rate 0.331 0.348 0.334 0.320 0.134 0.136 0.123 0.115 0.088 
Gyeongbuk 
 
B/L ratio 0.213 0.228 0.267 0.281 0.285 0.323 0.312 0.340 0.356 
Tax rate 0.338 0.341 0.326 0.312 0.145 0.140 0.131 0.115 0.092 
Gyeongnam 
 
B/L ratio 0.365 0.387 0.334 0.415 0.271 0.377 0.774 0.558 0.571 
Tax rate 0.333 0.337 0.328 0.360 0.161 0.146 0.138 0.121 0.095 
Jeju 
B/L ratio 0.292 0.285 0.293 0.294 0.243 0.173 0.361 0.431 0.373 
Tax rate 0.429 0.340 0.326 0.334 0.164 0.139 0.137 0.090 0.091 
 
Source: Korea Statistical Information Service
30
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IV. Methodology 
 
A. Basic Model for Housing and Commercial Building 
The analysis will be done in two ways; one for housing and the other for commercial 
building. As already mentioned, due to the limitation of data collection, I set two different 
models; however, they are basically almost identical. Using differenced data, the fixed effect 
model is applied because each of the cities and provinces has unique and rarely changing 
features. 
The housing model is as following: 
 
              
         
 = f(  , X;   , αi, ui), (i=0,1,2,3) 
For the commercial building: 
 
              
         
= h(
  
  
 , X;  
 
, αi, ui), (i=0,1,2,3) 
where,   = tax on structure 
   = tax on land 
  
 
= parameters 
αi= unobserved effect (cities and provinces heterogeneity) 
ui = idiosyncratic error 
 
 ２０ 
B. Hypothesis to Test 
 As it has shown so far, tax is likely to shrink economic activities and also construction 
activities as well. To see if tax rate affect the capital intensity, the hypothesis is set as below. 
For the housing model: 
    : 
      
     
 < 0 
For the commercial building: 
   : 
      
  
  
  
  
 < 0 
Therefore, if the hypothesis is rejected, we can say that the tax amount in housing and 
the tax ratio in commercial building are statistically significant. The numerator and the 
denominator move to the same direction if and only if 
      
  
  
  
  
 or 
      
     
 are positive and 
otherwise, vice versa.  
 ２１ 
V. Data Analysis 
 
A. Changes in Capital Intensity 
In order to review what impact has been occurring between capital intensity and tax 
rate for residential housing, tax rate for residential housing is set as an independent variable 
and residential housing structure to land ratio is set as a dependent variable to measure capital 
intensity. Due to the inconsistency of statistical data by the significant change in real estate 
tax system since 2005, the slope between two points; which is the differences in the first 
period (from 2001 to 2004) and that in the second period (from 2005 to 2009), will be 
calculated for the housing. In order to do so, the tax rate on residential housing and the area 
ratio of residential housing to land for cities and provinces was computed during the two 
periods. The result of calculation is summarized as <Table 4>. Eleven out of sixteen has 
negative relationships between area ratio and tax rate; on the other hand, five out of sixteen 
have positive relationships. Among the eleven districts, six of them are included in the major 
cities and five are from provinces. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ２２ 
<Table 4> The Impact of Revised Tax System on Capital intensity for Housing 
Classification Variables 
Average 
2001-2004 
Average 
2005-2009 
           
                  
 
Seoul 
Housing/land 1.55 1.81 
-0.836 
Building tax rate(%) 0.452 0.136 
Busan 
Housing/land 1.37 1.38 
-0.053 
Building tax rate 0.357 0.147 
Daegu 
Housing/land 1.40 1.19 
0.902 
Building tax rate 0.381 0.151 
Incheon 
Housing/land 1.02 1.13 
-0.552 
Building tax rate 0.345 0.147 
Gwangju 
Housing/land 1.14 0.90 
1.118 
Building tax rate 0.341 0.128 
Daejeon 
Housing/land 1.03 1.13 
-0.444 
Building tax rate 0.374 0.146 
Ulsan 
Housing/land 0.73 0.75 
-0.07 
Building tax rate 0.341 0.128 
Kyunggi 
Housing/land 0.96 0.79 
0.588 
Building tax rate 0.396 0.109 
Gangwon 
Housing/land 0.34 0.28 
0.299 
Building tax rate 0.317 0.125 
Chungbuk 
Housing/land 0.27 0.39 
-0.542 
Building tax rate 0.335 0.13 
Chungnam 
Housing/land 0.23 0.24 
-0.061 
Building tax rate 0.325 0.132 
Jeonbuk 
Housing/land 0.31 0.31 
0.01 
Building tax rate 0.348 0.125 
Jeonnam 
Housing/land 0.20 0.21 
-0.08 
Building tax rate 0.333 0.119 
Gyeongbuk 
Housing/land 0.25 0.29 
-0.205 
Building tax rate 0.329 0.125 
Gyeongnam 
Housing/land 0.38 0.35 
0.125 
Building tax rate 0.34 0.132 
Jeju 
Housing/land 0.29 0.25 
0.174 
Building tax rate 0.357 0.124 
 
Source: Korea Statistical Information Service31 
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 ２３ 
B. Factors that Affect Capital Intensity 
To see the relationship between building to land tax ratio and the other factors
32
, first 
of all, the time series is divided by two periods. The area is separated as seven major cities
33
 
and the nine other provinces
34
. The time period is divided before and after 2005
35
 for 
residential housing and for the commercial building, the data was used from 2005 to 2009. 
The independent variables are different in housing and commercial building because housing 
is more likely to be affected by regional factor and also consumer’s behavior or expectation. 
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 Regional GDP, housing price index, and population density 
33
 Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Gwangju, Daejeon, Ulsan 
34
 Kyunggi, Gangwon, Chungbuk, Chungnam, Jeonbuk, Jeonnam, Gyeongbuk, Gyeongnam, Jeju 
35
 Due to the unavailability of housing price index for provinces, before 2005 is constructed with only 
two years data. 
 ２４ 
1. Case of the Housing 
The focus of this paper is to find the effect of tax on the capital intensity, thus the 
relationship between the two factors is graphically displayed in cities and provinces through 
<Figure1>. As you can see from the below graph, changes of tax ratio in residential housing 
to land and changes of spatial area ratio in residential housing to land have a negative 
relationship.  
 
<Figure1> Changes in capital intensity as changes  
in building tax ratio residential housing 
36
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 Changes from 2001 to 2004 and from 2005 to 2009, respectively 
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 ２５ 
2. Regression Result for the Housing 
The regression equation for the fixed effect of housing is as following: 
 btlait =    +   · btaxit +   · popdensit +   · rgdpcapitait + αi + uit, (i=1,2,···,16; t=1,2) 
where,  
 btla = changes in area ratio  
as an indicator of capital intensity on land: 
              
         
 
 btax = changes in tax on structure 
 popdens = changes in population density 
 rgdpcapita = changes in regional GDP per capita 
αi = unobserved effect (cities and provinces heterogeneity) 
uit= idiosyncratic error 
 
And the fitted equation is 
      = 0.134 – 177·      – .0014·         + .0085·            
(0.088)   (87.07*)       (.0009)                   (.0324) 
  
            *:10% significance level 
 
The coefficient of                and             do not show statistically 
significant relationship at the conventional level except for       and its p-value is 0.062. 
Thus, we can say that the residential building’s spatial area ratio decreases 177m2 as the 
 ２６ 
building tax increases by 1%. Although it is not quite significant, the coefficient of 
population density has a p-value of 0.159. Therefore, either relatively more tax on building or 
less tax on land induces low level of the residential housing’s spatial area on the same size of 
land and the population density has a bit of impact on capital intensity. 
I estimated the value using different independent variables; for example, using only 
residential housing tax, residential housing tax and population density or residential housing 
tax and regional GDP per capita. 
 
The results are: 
      = 0.157 – 133.4402·      
(0.032***)   (78.97) 
 
      = 0.155 – 170.06·      – .0013·          
(0.031***)   (79.44**)       (.0009)             
 
       = 0.161 – 132.35·      – .0015·              
(0.090)   (85.15)              (.033)                    
 
             **: 5% significance level 
           ***: 1% significance level 
 
  
 ２７ 
3. Case of the Commercial Building 
The <figure2> below shows that the relationship between capital intensity and tax 
ratio. And it seems like to have overall negative relationship. For the commercial building, 
taller commercial building is more likely to be located in the place where the bigger size of 
regional GDP and higher population density are due to the profitability. 
 
<Figure2> Tax ratio and capital intensity of commercial building, 2005 ~ 2009 
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 ２８ 
4. Regression Result for the Commercial Building 
The regression equation for the fixed effect commercial building is: 
btlait =    +   ·btltit +   · popdensit +   · rgdpit + αi + uit (i=1,2,···,16; t=1,2,3,4,5) 
where, 
btla = commercial building’s spatial area ratio37  
btlt = commercial building’s tax ratio38  
popdens = population density  
rgdp = regional GDP 
αi = The unknown intercept for each observation, (i=1….n) 
 
And the fitted equation of it is 
     = 2.237 – .748·     – .0001·        – .00091·     
(0.324
***
)   (.271
***
)   (.00002
***
)         (.0013) 
 
***:1% significance level 
 
The coefficient of btlt and popden show statistically significant relationships at the 
conventional 1% level and its p-value is 0.007 and almost 0, respectively. Thus, the 
commercial building’s spatial area ratio decreases 0.748 as the building to land tax ratio 
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38 
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increases by 1 and thousand additional persons per squared kilometer decreases the 
commercial building’s spatial area ratio by 0.1. On the other hand, 1 trilion won of regional 
GDP growth decreases by 0.00091 of the commercial building’s spatial area ratio; however, 
it is not significant at the conventional level. 
The result says that either more tax on building or less tax on land induces low level 
in the ratio of the commercial building’s spatial area on the same size of land. However, 
higher regional GDP encourages the commercial building’s spatial area on the same size of 
land with very low confidence level, so the effect is ambiguous. On the other hand, 
population density increases the commercial building’s spatial area on the same size of. 
  
 ３０ 
VI. Implication 
 
From the data analysis of housing, residential housing to land tax ratio has a negative 
effect on capital intensity. For commercial building, on the other hand, it is revealed that 
building tax rate and population density have negative correlation with the supply of 
commercial building’s spatial area; however, regional GDP has a positive relationship with it. 
 
A. Taxation on Residential Housing 
In case of housing, higher tax ratio is interpreted as bringing lower capital intensity. It 
is consistent with the view of economics: tax is harmful to produce and price determines 
supplied quantity. Increasing tax on the improvement causes lower capital intensity which 
means low building to land ratio.  
 
B. Taxation on Improvement in Commercial Building 
For commercial buildings, higher tax ratio brings lower commercial building’s spatial 
area on the same size of land and higher regional GDP has a tendency to increase the supply 
of commercial building’s spatial area on the same size of land. Most of the high GDP 
producing regions would require more space for producing goods or services; this is the 
reason for the positive relationship between regional GDP and commercial building’s spatial 
area on the same size of land. Therefore, if the government collects more tax on land and less 
tax on the improvement, the land price would decrease and construction will be activated. 
 ３１ 
And of course the government tax revenue would increase. Lastly, population density and its 
squared number in a commercial building model shows positive relationship and negative 
relationship, respectively. Because a city or province can bear at a certain number of people; 
however, after that point the district cannot bear it anymore. As a result, the area of building 
on the same size of land starts to decrease by enlarging the urban size. 
  
 ３２ 
VII. Limitation and Further Studies 
 
A. Limitation 
 Throughout the study, I faced a little difficulty. First, it was too tough to collect the 
best suitable data; I could not get the right data because most of the statistical data has been 
provided as a secondary data. Since 2005, the statistic department seems pay more attention 
on its data than before; however, it was still not enough to get necessary data. For example, I 
could not get the real tax rate because the department did not show the price of the houses, 
buildings, and land in each local. 
 Second, frequent changes in the real estate tax items; even the officers at the district 
office were confused and tax payers even do not know why they have to pay that much 
amount of money as tax. Due to those difficulties, the statistic data here is used under 
manipulating by the author.
39
 Nevertheless, the data was not exaggerated or modified 
arbitrarily. Thus, the result would be reinforced if the best suitable data is applied.  
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 You may see how I dealt with the data in the ‘Data’ part of this paper. 
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B. Further Studies 
 To conduct more precise study, the classification of the provinces and cities had to be 
divided as the smallest unit like district or small city. For that, the data from small and 
medium cities and districts would be necessarily required. On top of that, ordinances from 
each of the local governments have to be reviewed because the local head officers can 
increase or decrease its tax rate within 50% by exercising autonomous entity. Therefore, 
hundreds of local governments will be included as subjects. For that reason, this study 
considered only seven cities and nine provinces.  
 ３４ 
VIII. Concluding Remarks 
Real estate and its supply and demand are distinguished with the other goods and 
market due to its characters. Even though the government exercises its authority to collect tax 
from the people, we could not find any strong consensus regarding how we levy tax on real 
estate and on what ground the government can do. However, general consensus has already 
been existed for taxation: the less excessive burden the better tax is. Accordingly, real estate 
holding tax is better than the transaction tax and levying tax on land is better than that on 
improvement. 
On the ground of that consensus, I performed empirical test on commercial building 
and housing, respectively. Although individual result is not always significant throughout the 
whole materials in housing and commercial building, the area of commercial buildings and 
residential housing on the same size of land tends to increase when either the building to land 
tax ratio or the tax on residential housing is smaller. In other words, capital intensity is 
relatively higher when either tax on land increases or tax on the improvement decreases.  
 In the two-rate tax, the major problem is how to evaluate land value and improvement 
value, separately. It is impossible to evaluate exactly in what amount of the value comes from 
land or structure and to capture hundred percent of the land value or the structure; however, 
approximately it can be estimated by subtracting the value of vacant land from the whole real 
estate. There would be rare economically perfect policy due to the dead weight loss; 
nevertheless, policymakers have to implement some policies when they consider those 
policies are needed. In such case that the policy is more oriented for the general public’s 
interests even though the total benefit is smaller than economically maximized surplus. For 
example, mail service, railroad, water supply service, and in some extent, housing can be 
included in that area. 
 ３５ 
 When the government tries to rectify tax system, there would be some resistances. To 
persuade people who resisting a reformation, the requirement is not a perfect or compact 
policies design rather than that how instigate the people to understand even though the policy 
seems to be imperfect in economical sense. With logically perfect and compact designed 
policy cannot persuade people who just hate or reluctant it, but if it is succeeded to stimulate 
sympathetic mind of the people, it might be possible to make a reformation. 
 To summing up, tax policy that encourages supply of construction is not always valid 
for housing market; however, it worked for commercial building. This is because there are 
various independent variables in the supply and demand of the housing market, for example, 
development plan, speculative demand, transportation system, etc. Some of those 
independent variables are also included in commercial building; however, I assume that the 
most powerful variable is speculative demand for housing market. Paradoxically, to exclude 
the influences from the various independent variables
40
, the government has to increase real 
estate holding tax so that the land owners cannot take advantage of the benefits from such 
public development issues. However, we already know from some empirical evidences that 
tax on real estate cannot mitigate real estate price but rather raise the price. At this point, split 
real estate tax is required, which separates land tax and improvement tax from the 
compounded real estate tax, so that the economy is activated by supply of spatial space and 
the land price goes down by the land tax. Then, two-rate tax can affect the housing price 
indirectly by increasing the supply of space and reducing land price, simultaneously.  
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 That is normally related to some lucrative development businesses, 
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